

Message Text

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ORIGIN PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 SIG-01 MMO-01 ACDA-07
OES-07 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 /090 R

DRAFTED BY OPNAV616:JFDRAIN:JMM
APPROVED BY PM/ISP:MAGMICHAUD
PM/ISP - CAPT. GROSE
EUR/RPM - MR. HAWES
NEA/RA - MR. PADELFORD
OSD/ISA - MR. WOODS
-----094142 112104Z /65

R 102103Z AUG 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA
SECDEF
JCS WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
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CINCUSNAVEUR
USCINCEUR
CINCLANTFLT
USNMR SHAPE
USDOCOSOUTH
COMSIXTHFLT

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USCINCEUR AND CINCUSNAVEUR ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652:XGDS-3

TAGS: MARR, MNUC, ZM

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIP (NPW) VISITS TO THE
MEDITERRANEAN

1. DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT NUCLEAR POWERED TASK GROUP (NPTG), COMPOSED OF USS NIMITZ (CVN-68), USS CALIFORNIA (CGN-36) AND USS SOUTH CAROLINA (CGN-37), WILL BEGIN A SIX MONTH DEPLOYMENT TO THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AS COMPONENTS OF THE U.S. SIXTHFLT IN MID-DECEMBER 1977. THIS MARKS THE SECOND SUCH DEPLOYMENT OF THIS NUCLEAR TASK GROUP, THE LAST HAVING BEEN FROM JULY 76 TO JAN 77. AS WAS THE CASE BEFORE, EACH OF THESE SHIPS WILL REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY NINETY DAYS IN PORT DURING THEIR DEPLOYMENT TO MEET NORMAL SHIP LIBERTY AND MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS.

2. AS THE DATE OF THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT DRAWS NEARER, THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN IMPROVING PORT ACCESS FOR THE NPTG, OVER THAT EXISTING DURING THE LAST DEPLOYMENT, HAS BECOME AN INCREASINGLY SERIOUS CONCERN. THE MINIMAL
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NUMBER OF AVAILABLE PORTS, PARTICULARLY FOR A LARGE SHIP SUCH AS THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER NIMITZ, HAS AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE FLEXIBILITY OF FLEET OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION, TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN MAXIMIZE ACCESS TO AS MANY MEDITERRANEAN PORTS AS POSSIBLE, THE GREATER THE LIKELIHOOD

THAT SHIP VISITS -- WHETHER NUCLEAR OR NON-NUCLEAR -- WILL BE TREATED IN A NORMAL (I.E., NON-POLITICAL) MANNER. THE FOLLOWING OUTLINE PROVIDES AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM BY REVIEWING THE STATUS OF NPW ACCESS TO PORTS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL BY COUNTRY:

A. ALGERIA. USN SHIPS HAVE NOT VISITED ALGERIAN PORTS FOR OVER TEN YEARS. SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS ROUTINELY VISIT FOR ABOUT NINE DAYS PER MONTH. FRENCH NAVAL VESSELS CALL INFREQUENTLY. RECENT GOVERNMENT OF ALGERIA INITIATIVES FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH USG RAISE POSSIBILITY OF SHIP VISITS IN THE FUTURE. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT ALGERIAN ACQUIESCENCE IN U.S. NAVAL VISITS AT THIS TIME.

B. EGYPT. THE INITIAL NPW VISIT WAS MADE BY USS CALIFORNIA TO ALEXANDRIA IN MID-OCTOBER 1976. THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THIS VISIT ON THE SAME BASIS AS CONVENTIONALLY POWERED WARSHIP VISITS. ADDITIONAL VISITS BY CRUISERS DURING THE FORTHCOMING DEPLOYMENT ARE EXPECTED, AND IT IS EXPECTED THAT A VISIT BY THE AIR-

CRAFT CARRIER WILL BE REQUESTED.

C. FRANCE. ACCESS TO FRENCH PORTS FOR U.S. NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIPS WAS TERMINATED IN 1969 AND HAS BEEN SUSPENDED SINCE THAT DATE. ALTHOUGH A MAJOR EFFORT IS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY TO REGAIN ACCESS TO FRENCH PORTS ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS, WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO GET A RESPONSE TO THE DISCUSSION HELD IN JANUARY 77, AND THUS WE ARE UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED CAN
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BE RESOLVED DURING THE PERIOD OF THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF THE NUCLEAR POWERED TASK GROUP.

D. GIBRALTAR. U.S. CONVENTIONALLY POWERED WARSHIPS REGULARLY AND ROUTINELY VISIT GIBRALTAR. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF SPANISH SENSITIVITIES AND OUR ON-GOING EFFORTS TO GAIN NPW ACCESS TO MORE SPANISH PORTS, NPW VISITS TO GIBRALTAR HAVE BEEN HELD TO A MINIMUM CONSISTENT WITH OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. OUR INABILITY TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS IN SPAIN MAY FORCE HIGHER UTILIZATION OF GIBRALTAR THAN MIGHT OTHERWISE BE NECESSARY.

E. GREECE. THE GOVERNMENT OF GREECE HAS HISTORICALLY NOT DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN CONVENTIONALLY AND NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIPS. AFTER A PERIOD IN 1975-76 WHEN GREEK PORTS WERE CLOSED TO ALL U.S. WARSHIPS IN REACTION TO THE CYPRUS CRISIS, A MODEST VISIT PROGRAM HAS BEEN INITIATED. A NUCLEAR POWERED CRUISER AND SEVERAL NUCLEAR POWERED ATTACK SUBMARINES HAVE VISITED GREEK PORTS IN THE PAST YEAR.

WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT OF GREECE WOULD APPROVE A HIGHLY VISIBLE VISIT BY THE NIMITZ, IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE WHICH HAS OCCASIONAL ANTI-U.S. OUTBURSTS, REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED. WE ANTICIPATE REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL VISITS BY THE NUCLEAR POWERED CRUISERS.

F. ISRAEL. A U.S. NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIP FIRST VISITED ISRAEL IN SEPTEMBER 1976. A PATTERN OF ROUTINE NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONALLY POWERED WARSHIP VISITS OF A LIMITED NUMBER ANNUALLY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. WE ANTICIPATE A REQUEST FOR A VISIT BY USS NIMITZ AS WELL AS THE NUCLEAR POWERED CRUISERS.

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G. ITALY. DURING THE LAST NPTG DEPLOYMENT, ITALY BORE THE BRUNT OF PORT VISITS AS ONE OF THE FEW COUNTRIES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL ROUTINELY ACCEPTING RECURRING NPW VISITS TO SEVERAL PORTS. BECAUSE OF RECENT AGREEMENT

BY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW NUCLEAR POWERED CRUISER AND SUBMARINE VISITS TO SEVERAL ADDITIONAL PORTS BEYOND THOSE AVAILABLE PREVIOUSLY, WE DO NOT EXPECT TO MAKE A FURTHER REQUEST FOR THESE SHIPS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. NAPLES AND TARANTO, HOWEVER, ARE THE ONLY OPERATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE PORTS APPROVED BY THE ITALIANS FOR USE BY THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER.

H. LEBANON. SIXTHFLT SHIPS HAVE NOT VISITED PORTS IN LEBANON SINCE THE LATE 1960S, MOST RECENTLY BECAUSE OF THE TURMOIL GENERATED BY THE CIVIL WAR IN THAT COUNTRY. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE PRESENT LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOW ACCEDE TO REQUESTS FOR PORTS CALLS, BUT, IN ANY CASE, THE DEPARTMENT CONSIDERS THAT CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL TENSIONS IN LEBANON ARGUE AGAINST U.S. NAVY SHIP VISITS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE NPTG DEPLOYMENT.

I. MALTA. THE GOVERNMENT OF MALTA DOES NOT PERMIT ANY U.S. OR SOVIET WARSHIP VISITS. NO CHANGE TO THIS POLICY IS FORESEEN.

J. MONACO. THE PRINCIPALITY WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT PORT OF CALL FOR THE NIMITZ, AND THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THE PRINCE FAVORS A VISIT. BECAUSE OF THE PRINCIPALITY'S CLOSE TIE TO FRANCE, NO SEPARATE INITIATIVE HAD BEEN MADE WHILE THERE WAS PROSPECT OF EARLY RESOLUTION OF THE FRENCH NPW ISSUE. IN THE ABSENCE OF FURTHER MOVEMENT TOWARD RESUMPTION OF VISITS TO FRENCH PORTS, WE MAY RECONSIDER SUBMITTING A REQUEST TO VISIT MONACO, RECOGNIZING THAT THE POSITION OF THE FRENCH ON SUCH A REQUEST MIGHT BE CRUCIAL TO GETTING APPROVAL FROM THE GOM.

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K. MOROCCO. SEVERAL VISITS BY U.S. NPW TO MOROCCAN PORTS HAVE OCCURRED, INCLUDING A VISIT BY EACH SHIP OF THE NPTG, AND AN SSN VISIT. A POLICY WELCOMING NPW VISITS IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE.

L. PORTUGAL. SUCCESSFUL VISITS BY NUCLEAR POWERED ATTACK SUBMARINES HAVE CONTINUED TO BE CONDUCTED ROUTINELY DURING THE PAST YEAR. GOVERNMENTAL WILLINGNESS TO APPROVE VISITS BY SURFACE NPW WAS ALSO EXPRESSED BUT FLEET OPERATIONS COULD NOT ACCOMMODATE THIS. WE EXPECT THIS RECEPTIVE ATTITUDE TO CONTINUE. HOWEVER, PORTUGAL'S RESPONSIVENESS ALLEVIATES THE MEDITERRANEAN SITUATION ONLY BY PROVIDING A VISIT OPTION PRIOR TO OR FOLLOWING THE OPERATIONS AS PART OF THE U.S. SIXTHFLT.

M. SPAIN. A SIGNIFICANT FIRST STEP TOWARD NPW ACCESS TO SPANISH PORTS OCCURRED AT THE END OF THE LAST NPTG DEPLOYMENT. THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN APPROVED VISITS BY

SURFACE NPW AND NUCLEAR POWERED ATTACK SUBMARINES AT THE ROTA BASE. ACCESS TO ROTA PROVIDES A CONVENIENT PORT OF CALL FOR USE PRIOR TO ARRIVAL FOR OR ON DEPARTURE FROM A DEPLOYMENT, BUT DOES LITTLE TO IMPROVE THE OVERALL NPW PORT ACCESS PROBLEM IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. WHILE WE APPEARED TO BE MAKING SOME PROGRESS TOWARD OPENING THE FIRST SPANISH MEDITERRANEAN PORT TO NPW VISITS, A REQUEST FOR A NUCLEAR POWERED ATTACK SUBMARINE VISIT TO PALMA DE MALLORCA HAS JUST BEEN DISAPPROVED BY THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.

N. SYRIA. SIXTHFLT SHIP VISITS TO SYRIA HAVE NOT BEEN CONDUCTED RECENTLY AND ARE CURRENTLY DISCOURAGED BY THE DEPARTMENT. THE DEPARTMENT BELIEVES IT MIGHT BE PREMATURE
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TO RAISE CONCEPT OF VISITS AT THIS TIME BUT WISHES TO KEEP THE SUBJECT UNDER REVIEW.

O. TUNISIA. THE GOVERNMENT OF TUNISIA DOES NOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN CONVENTIONALLY AND NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIPS. SUCCESSFUL VISITS WERE CONDUCTED BY SHIPS OF THE NPTG IN 1976 AND BY SSNS IN 1976-77. NO CHANGE IN VISIT POLICY IS ANTICIPATED.

P. TURKEY. NPW VISITS TO TURKEY WERE SUSPENDED IN 1969 DUE TO UNACCEPTABLE DEMANDS FOR LIABILITY GUARANTEES BY THE TURKS. IN ADDITION, THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS THAT GOT WILL NOT CONSIDER ANY NPW VISIT UNTIL A DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT IS RATIFIED. DEPARTMENT IS NOT AWARE OF ANY CHANGE IN GOT ATTITUDE. OTHER ISSUES APPLICABLE ONLY TO NPW MAY COME TO LIGHT AT THAT TIME.

Q. YUGOSLAVIA. U.S. NPW HAVE NEVER VISITED YUGOSLAVIA. ALTHOUGH CONVENTIONALLY POWERED WARSHIP VISITS CAN BE MADE THREE TIMES PER YEAR, THE GOVERNMENT OF YUGOSLAVIA UNEXPECTEDLY DISAPPROVED A REQUEST FOR A NUCLEAR-POWERED ATTACK SUBMARINE TO BE PART OF A RECENT VISIT GROUP. REASONS BEHIND THIS DISAPPROVAL AND EFFORTS TO OVERCOME OBJECTIONS WILL BE PURSUED ON A LOW KEY BASIS.

3. IT IS APPARENT THAT WE CANNOT RELAX OUR EFFORT IF WE ARE TO DEPLOY EFFECTIVELY THE NUCLEAR POWERED TASK GROUP TO THE MEDITERRANEAN THIS WINTER. LACK OF ASSURED ACCESS FOR FLEET UNITS OF THIS NATURE LIMITS OUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT THE PRESENCE OF U.S. SEAPOWERS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS. CONSEQUENTLY, ADEQUATE PORT ACCESS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN FOR OUR NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIPS REMAINS A HIGH PRIORITY U.S. OBJECTIVE. WHEN A SECOND ATLANTIC NUCLEAR POWERED TASK GROUP BECOMES OPERATIONAL IN LATE 1979, THE PROBLEMS WILL BE FURTHER COMPOUNDED.

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4. PAST AND ON-GOING EFFORTS OF POSTS TO BROADEN NPW ACCESS ARE APPRECIATED. WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY YOUR VIEWS ON RESOLVING ACCESS PROBLEMS AND FACTORS SUCH AS FREQUENCY AND COMPOSITION OF VISITS. ACCORDINGLY, ACTION ADDRESSES ARE REQUESTED TO VALIDATE, UPDATE OR EXPAND DEPARTMENT'S OUTLOOK IN PARA 2 ABOVE, WITH EMPHASIS ON ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN TO INCREASE THE AVAILABLE PORT VISIT OPPORTUNITIES OF THE NPTG DEPLOYING IN DECEMBER, ESPECIALLY TO PORTS WHICH CAN ACCOMMODATE THE NIMITZ. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM INFORMATION ADDRESSEES ARE ALSO WELCOME.

CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: VISITS, NUCLEAR POWERED SHIPS, NIMITZ USS, CALIFORNIA USS, SOUTH
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 10-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE189071
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
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Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 XGDS-3
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
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Subject: NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIP (NPW) VISITS TO THE MEDITERRANEAN
TAGS: MARR, MNUC, ZM, US
To: MADRID LISBON MULTIPLE
Type: TE
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